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T
he decision by the Rector of St Bede’s College to
suspend two of its students from competing in a
national sporting competition — and the successful
legal action that prevented the suspension from taking effect
— caused nothing short of a national outcry. Amongst all of
the invective, however, was a great deal of confusion about
the proper place and function of administrative law in mat-
ters such as school disciplinary decisions. If we look beyond
the claims that this case represented “self-entitled parents”
and “judicial arrogance” that “undermines the authority” of
educators, we see instead, perhaps, a sound judgment and a
system working correctly.
THE FACTS
St Bede’s College is an integrated school in Christchurch. Ten
of its students were selected to compete in the Maadi Cup
(the New Zealand Secondary Schools Rowing Regatta) at
Lake Karapiro. Two coaches accompanied the students from
Christchurch to Auckland on 20 March 2015. In the baggage
collection area of Auckland airport, two students, Jack Bell
and Jordan Kennedy, possibly at the instigation of other
students, rode on the baggage carousel into the secure bag-
gage area. Unauthorised entry into a security area at an
airport is an offence under the Civil Aviation (Offences)
Regulations 2006. Messrs Bell and Kennedy were spoken to
by Police and airport security personnel, although they only
received a stern warning. Another student filmed the inci-
dent, and the coaches informed the Head of Sport at St Bede’s
College who then informed the Rector, Justin Boyle, about
the incident. At 2.00 p.m. the same day, Mr Boyle decided to
suspend the students from the rowing team and required that
they return to Christchurch immediately. The effect of this
decision was to prevent the students from being considered
for selection in trials for a national rowing team.
A lawyer for the parents contacted Mr Boyle the next day
— a Saturday — asking the school to reconsider its decision
on the basis that it was a disproportionate response and
potentially breached principles of natural justice. On the
Sunday, the Rector, the Deputy Principal and a legal adviser
flew to Lake Karapiro and discussed the matter with the
father of one of the students. At the conclusion of this
meeting, the Rector confirmed his original suspension deci-
sion without any further investigation. An application by the
students — with their parents acting as litigation guardians
— to the High Court for interim relief preventing the suspen-
sion from taking effect was heard on Monday 23 March at
9.00 a.m., the first race of the day being less than three hours
away. Justice Dunningham allowed the application for an
interim injunction (Kennedy and Anor v Boyle [2015] NZHC
530) with reasons following later that day ( [2015] NZHC
536).
THE COURT’S DECISION
The basis of the application was that the suspension was
open to judicial review on two main bases. First, depending
on how the suspension decision was characterised, it did not
comply with various provisions of the Education Act 1989
and/or common law precedent on the reasonableness of
school disciplinary decisions. Second, Mr Boyle breached the
principles of natural justice by, inter alia, failing to investi-
gate the incident properly; not giving the students the oppor-
tunity to respond; and failing to take into account relevant
considerations, including their contrition, the consequences
of the decision, and the involvement of third parties in the
incident. Moreover, the meeting with one of the parents on
Sunday 22 March was insufficient to cure any flaws in the
initial process since it simply confirmed the original decision
of Mr Boyle.
The application for interim orders was made under the
High Court Rules rather than the Judicature Amendment
Act 1972. Accordingly, applying the orthodox test for such
applications, the Court had to consider whether the proceed-
ings indicated there was a serious question to be tried, and if
so, where the balance of convenience lay. Justice Dun-
ningham approached the first threshold question by assum-
ing that regardless of whether and how the parents could
challenge the validity of the decision (the parents’ first basis
of review) they would nevertheless have the ability to chal-
lenge the decision to suspend the students on the basis that
Mr Boyle failed to adhere to the principles of natural justice
(their second basis). Disciplinary decisions with serious con-
sequences are amenable to judicial review if they were made
in “breach of natural justice, or without regard to relevant
considerations” which include “the proportionality of the
punishment to the misconduct … or by having regard to
irrelevant considerations” (at [24]).
The response by the Rector and the St Bede’s College
Board of Trustees (the respondents) to the applicants’ natural
justice allegations was straightforward. The students and
their parents had signed a code of conduct prior to the trip,
and were on notice that a breach of this code could lead to the
students being sent home. The school classified the students’
illegal actions as serious misconduct that justified the invo-
cation of that threat — that the students might not be able to
competewassimplya foreseeableconsequenceof theirbehaviour.
In order for the disciplinary action to be effective — to send
a message to the students and their peers — Mr Boyle had to
make the decision quickly, and thus his enquiry was justifi-
ably truncated.
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Despite this, however, Dunningham J noted (at [25]) that
each case required careful consideration and the weighing of
the individual circumstances at issue. Her Honour was sat-
isfied that there was a serious question as to whether that had
occurred in this case, holding that it is seriously arguable that
a decision,
… based on the emailed report of a head coach who was
not present when the incident took place, without inter-
viewing the boys in question or the other participants, and
without gathering information on the consequences of the
decision to assess whether it was proportionate to the
alleged misbehaviour…
fails to meet the requirements of natural justice (at [26]).
Similarly, it was arguable that the school failed to take into
account the relevant considerations of the impact upon third
parties:other teammembers,parentsandsponsors (at [26]–[27]).
Accordingly, the applicants met the first threshold that there
was a serious question to be tried.
Regarding the balance of convenience, Dunningham J
held that that lay in favour of the applicants. The immediate
impact of the decision is that the students would not be able
to compete in the regatta, thus scuttling any chance they had
of trialling for a New Zealand team. Whilst the applicants
argued that the impact on the school was low — it could
impose a substitute punishment when the students returned
to Christchurch — Dunningham J disagreed. Interim orders
would amount to a public restraint of the school from using
a disciplinary procedure designed to show there are swift and
severe consequences for students who misbehave when rep-
resenting their school at a national event. The consequences
of the orders would affect the potency of such disciplinary
action generally, and were broader than just the case before
the Court. Thus, Dunningham J was faced with the choice of
whether the “the school’s ability to use swift and potent
sanctions for misbehaviour”, which could be substituted if
the school was eventually vindicated at trial, should prevail
over the “immediate and irreparable adverse consequences”
the students would face even if their application for review
was successful (at [32]). It was the irreversibility of the
consequences facing the students that made them more sig-
nificant than those the school would face, and thus Dun-
ningham J granted the application for interim relief, preventing
the suspension from taking effect and allowing the students
to compete. Dunningham J noted the importance of progress-
ing the proceedings to a substantive hearing as soon as
possible, and that it was important to the school to have the
validity of its decision tested. The interim orders were “nei-
ther an endorsement of the boys’ behaviour, nor a decision
that the school’s response was inappropriate” (at [38]).
THE FALLOUT
Given the efficiency, relative comprehensiveness, and mea-
sured nature of Dunningham J’s judgment, it is surprising
that the almost-universal reaction by academia, practitio-
ners, media and the public was so vehement. The parents’
application for interim orders “stinks to high heaven of elitist
self-entitlement” (Mike Yardley, The Press, 23 March 2015).
The Dean of the University of Canterbury’s School of Law,
Dr Chris Gallavin. called the “lamentable” decision a “ter-
rible situation” that “shouldn’t have come to the courts and
the court should not have upheld the application” (Kloe
Palmer, TV3 News, 24 March 2015). The judgment was
result of a legacy of “feeble” and “arrogant” judges who
“forget their responsibility to the rule of law” (Stephen
Franks, National Business Review, 27 March 2015) and one
that set a “dangerous precedent”(Nicholas Jones and Kurt
Bayer, New Zealand Herald, 24 March 2015). These state-
ments accompanied a large public outcry following the deci-
sion, largely in favour of the school and its authority to
discipline students as it wished. Meanwhile two rowing
coaches and a school trustee resigned from their positions
soon afterward, stating that Mr Boyle had overridden the
head coach’s initial decision not to take further action against
the students.
Closer inspection of Dunningham J’s decision indicated
that the furore was misplaced. Of course, there are signifi-
cant access to justice issues underlying these proceedings that
should not be understated or ignored: the ability to seek
interim relief in this situation, given the costs involved, is
restricted to very few students and parents in New Zealand.
However, these issues are omnipresent in civil proceedings;
they are out of reach for the majority of the population and
this is an ever-worsening problem in our civil justice system.
Putting those issues to one side, does the decision neverthe-
less represent “arrogant” judging that sets a “dangerous
precedent”?
THE AMENABILITY OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY
DECISIONS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
At least some of the outrage is attributable to another High
Court decision granting an application for review of a school’s
disciplinary decision: Battison v Melloy [2014] NZAR 927.
This case generated headlines because it involved a student
reviewing the decision of his school — St John’s College in
Hastings — to suspend him after he refused to comply with
the Principal’s request that he cut his hair. Collins J held that,
inter alia, the decision by the Principal to suspend the student
was unlawful because it did not meet the criteria set by s
14(1)(a) of the Education Act: the student’s disobedience did
not meet the required threshold and there was no objective
evidence that the disobedience set a dangerous or harmful
example to other students. As with Kennedy v Boyle, the
reaction to this decision was significant, as was the concern
about the precedent it would set. In this light, Kennedy is
perhaps simply the continuation of a worrying trend that
allows and encourages students (and their parents) unhappy
with disciplinary decisions to pursue legal action in order to
prevent their enforcement.
The jurisprudence on school disciplinary decisions, how-
ever, suggests that this concern is misplaced. In 2013 alone —
the year for which statistics are readily available from the
Ministry of Education — there were 15,509 cases where a
student was stood down, 3,082 suspensions, 1064 exclu-
sions and 137 expulsions. However, there have been fewer
than ten instances of students successfully seeking judicial
review of these and other disciplinary decisions in the past
decade. Each decision might have marked a new era of
litigiousness, just as Battison and Kennedy supposedly rep-
resent, but each failed to catalyse. Thus, judicial review of
disciplinary action by schools is a rare occurrence, and this
will likely continue to be the case, as an analysis of the legal
framework surrounding such decisions will make clear.
The provisions in the Education Act regulating serious
disciplinary action against students (for example, suspen-
sions) are supplemented by explanatory rules (the Education
(Stand-Down,Suspension,Exclusion,andExpulsion)Rules1999)
and guidelines from the Ministry of Education “designed to
assist boards of trustees, principals, and teachers with their
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legal options and duties and meet their obligations under
relevant statutory requirements” (Ministry of Education,
2009). As the Court of Appeal in Bovaird v J [2008] NZAR
667 noted, this statutory framework, the result of the Edu-
cation Amendment Act 1999, was a response to concerns
about the unfairness and high volume of such serious disci-
plinary action. The Court of Appeal in Bovaird refused to
add any further specificity or impose any additional require-
ments on educators, instead focusing on the underlying pur-
pose of this framework as expressed in s 13 of the Act:
individualised assessment of each case to ensure the particu-
lar requirements of natural justice are met.
Educator compliance with their statutory obligations —
including the fulfilment of the particular duties of natural
justice warranted by the situation — is a reasonable expec-
tation, and one that draws little controversy when applied to
other decision-makers exercising public power. That more
deference and discretion is popularly afforded to educators is
perhaps a reflection of an outdated jurisprudential approach.
As Collins J in Battison noted, the Court was traditionally
“hesitant to enter the fray of school disciplinary proceedings
preferring ‘practical efficiency’ over ‘abstract justice’” but in
recent years, it has “been more willing to ensure the rights of
a student are given proper weight when revisiting school
disciplinary decisions” (at [49]–[50]). This shift in approach
represents a correction of a traditional, but unjustified reti-
cence to apply the orthodox requirements of administrative
decision-making to schools. As McGechan J noted in the
1990 decision of M v S [2003] NZAR 705 (HC) at 723,
referred to by Dunningham J in Kennedy, the Court:
… must be conscious not only of a public interest in
orderly education, but also of a need to protect the indi-
vidual child, and that child’s confidence it can receive
justice from authority.
The parallels between Kennedy and M v S are strong. First,
Kennedy, M v S involved disciplinary action by a Rector
against two students caught breaching a rigid code of con-
duct whilst they were representing their school at a national
competition. Second, Kennedy, McGechan J in M v S felt it
necessary to include a postscript that emphasised that the
decision did not represent a complete curtailment of a school’s
disciplinary powers, but instead that the statutory obliga-
tions on educators must not be “sacrificed to administrative
or disciplinary efficiency, or some supposed need for absolute
certainty. Results must not be fixed: they must instead be
fair” (at 725). Third, Kennedy, M v S represented an aberra-
tion: educators make literally thousands of disciplinary deci-
sions each year, and the overwhelming majority of those
decisions comply with the relevant requirements of natural
justice. We should not fear the few aberrations that represent
cases where public decision-makers do not comply with their
statutory power. To do so would undermine the faith that
students, parents, and other educators can have in their
education system and in administrative law. These aberra-
tions present a chance to remind educators that they exercise
significant public power, and as with anyone else who does
so, they exercise that power subject to the constraints of
administrative law. We ought to applaud — not vilify —
decisions such as Kennedy.
INTERIM RELIEF IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
The analysis above may not assuage those who criticised
Kennedy, not on the basis that the Court has no place
reviewing decisions of educators, but instead on the appro-
priateness of interim orders in this situation. The critique is
that it is too easy in this context for students to meet the
relevant thresholds for interim orders and then use those
orders to undermine disciplinary action. The potency of the
punishment in the present instance was the immediacy of the
decision and the significance of its consequences; an alterna-
tive punishment imposed at a later date lacked the same
effectiveness. However, the same immediacy and significance
of the decision that made it effective also made it vulnerable
to challenge by the interim relief procedure used by the
applicants. The immediacy of such decisions naturally gives
rise to natural justice concerns, making it likely that the
students would meet the first threshold of a serious case to be
tried. The significance of the decision similarly naturally tilts
the balance of convenience in favour of the students. Accord-
ingly, Kennedy sets a poor precedent, allowing students to
manipulate the interim relief procedure to prevent any imme-
diate and significant disciplinary action by educators.
There are two responses to this critique. The first is that
the circumstances of this case justified the granting of interim
relief, but this does not mean that all disciplinary decisions of
this kind will be vulnerable — it does not set a poor prece-
dent. Close analysis of Dunningham J’s decision shows that
on the evidence before her, it is no great surprise that she
granted the students’ application for interim orders. Regard-
ing the first threshold — whether there was a serious ques-
tion to be tried — even allowing for the necessity of an
immediate decision, there were substantial deficiencies in the
process adopted by Mr Boyle. Basing his decision solely on
the report of the head coach, who was not a witness to the
incident, and not talking to the students themselves repre-
sents a denial of natural justice to those students at its most
basic: one cannot expect to have her side of the case heard if
she was afforded no opportunity to express it. At trial, and
after cross-examination, the meeting between Mr Kennedy
and Mr Boyle might have cured these natural justice deficien-
cies, despite Mr Kennedy’s evidence to the contrary. That,
however, is precisely the point: Mr Boyle’s failure to talk to
the students represents a serious question that needs to be
tried in order to determine whether it was a deficiency that
was left uncured. Adding the fact that New Zealand has long
recognised the validity of proportionality as a ground of
judicial review with regards to penalties (Institute of Char-
tered Accountants v Bevan [2003] 1 NZLR 154 (CA)), one is
left with the impression that there was more than enough to
meet this first threshold. In that regard, this decision does not
set a poor precedent: it is imperative that educators follow
the basic tenets of natural justice. In terms of the balance of
convenience, while it was clear that the students had a good
case, one can easily envisage situations where the balance lies
in favour of a school, for example where granting of the
orders would put other students at risk for example. Once
again, Kennedy v Boyle stands on its own facts.
The second response to the critique that the interim relief
procedure adopted was inappropriate is to question the
acquiescence of the respondents to this procedure. The appli-
cation was brought without notice, on a Pickwick basis, and
so the respondents were without the benefit of time to
consider the appropriateness of applying the orthodox frame-
work to such applications as set down by American Cyanamid
Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL). There were at least
two alternative options to that approach that the respon-
dents might have argued were more appropriate.
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The first was the more stringent standard of requiring the
student applicants to show that there was a prima facie case
for the respondents to meet. Where, for example, interim
decisions are likely to amount to final decisions, the Court
has been willing to give closer scrutiny to an applicant’s case.
As McGechan J observed in NZ Olympic and Common-
wealth Games Association Inc v Telecom New Zealand Ltd
(1996) 7 TCLR 167 (HC) at 170:
If the decision in reality will be definitive, justice can
require something more than a marginal serious question
to be tried. One does not make final decisions on shadowy
contentions.
There was no time to conduct a substantive trial to determine
whether Mr Boyle’s decision was valid, since the punishment
was to take effect less than three hours after the hearing of
interimapplication.That interimapplication, therefore,amounted
in substance to the final decision, a point reinforced by the
fact that the applicant students withdrew their proceedings
on 1 April 2015.
The second option was to use s 8 of the Judicature
Amendment Act 1972 rather than pt 30 of the High Court
Rules. Section 8 allows an applicant for judicial review to
apply to the Court to restrain a respondent from taking
action consequent to the exercise of a statutory power to
preserve his or her position pending the hearing of the
application. Interim relief under s 8 is not available in all
applications for judicial review. Skilton v Fitzgibbon (1998)
12 PRNZ 58 — itself a case about reinstating a student to a
school after he was suspended — indicates that s 8 cannot be
used for mandatory interim relief. However, in this instance,
since the students were applying to the Court for interim
relief to restrain the school from implementing its decision,
the students had a position to preserve and applying under
s 8 was an available option. An argument by the respondents
that s 8 was more appropriate was worth pursuing since this
alternative approach may have given the underlying con-
cerns of the respondents greater weight.
The leading authority on s 8 is the Court of Appeal’s
decision in Carlton and United Breweries Ltd v Minister of
Customs [1986] 1 NZLR 423, 430 in which Cooke J held
that theprocedure isnot constrainedby theAmericanCyanamid
approach, and that:
The Court has a wide discretion to consider all the circum-
stances of the case, including the apparent strength or
weaknesses of the claim of the applicant for review, and
all the repercussions, public or private, of granting interim
relief.
Moreover, in Osborne v Minister of Education HC Hamilton,
M198/99, 4 October 1999, Hammond J held at [44] that “[a]
meritless case is not entitled to interim relief, otherwise these
applications become a mere delaying tactic.” In an earlier
decision, Esekielu v Attorney-General (1993) 6 PRNZ 309
(HC), the same judge, arguing that the approach ought to
reflect the nature of the interests involved, stated that the
Court must find that at the very least there is “[a] real contest
between the parties, and that the applicant has a reasonable
chance of succeeding in that contest” (at 313). This gives
credence to the theme of the argument by the respondents in
this case and concerns expressed by the wider commentariat:
the applicants’ case was weak; they were simply using the
interim application process to delay the effect of Mr Boyle’s
decision; and the consequences of interim relief had signifi-
cant public repercussions.
Ultimately, the difference between the two approaches
may be nothing more than semantic. The inherent flexibility
of the interim relief procedure under the High Court Rules is
such that it could have been adjusted to emulate the approach
under the Judicature Amendment Act: Y v Assessors (appointed
by the Assembly Executive Secretary of The Presbyterian
Church of Aotearoa New Zealand) HC Auckland, CIV-2009-
404-5165, 27 August 2009 at [14]. That does not diminish
the point, however. If the respondents were concerned about
the ease of the appellants obtaining interim relief, then it was
open to them to argue that closer examination of the appli-
cants’ case was necessary and appropriate.
Had the Court applied a more stringent test, the appli-
cants may not have met the threshold requirements, and the
concerns of the many vocal critics of this decision might have
been assuaged. Those critics, however, ought to note that
applying such a high standard would not be without its own
precedentialconsequences.AsMcGechanonProcedureatHR7.53.06
notes, there have been few indications that the Court is
willing to apply a higher standard for interim relief simply
because it involves judicial review proceedings. One such
indication was Finnigan v NZ Rugby Football Union Inc
(No 2) [1985] 2 NZLR 181 (HC), where Casey J held that
the existence of real hardship on the respondents might have
necessitated the application of the prima facie case standard.
That Finnigan remains an outlier in this particular regard, is
important. Controversial though it was at the time, Finnigan
is a symbol of why interim relief in judicial review proceed-
ings is so important. It is now lauded as an important
decision concerning the constraint of private actors exercis-
ing public power.Without this mechanism, that power might
have gone unchecked. At its heart, Kennedy v Boyle repre-
sents the same concerns. Yes, it undermined the authority of
the school to exercise its disciplinary powers as it wished; but
this is a far better outcome than having the abuse of those
powers lie unchecked and unchallengeable.
The historically deferential approach by the Court to
school discipline is anachronistic. Educators have no special
claim to exception from the tenets of natural justice and the
rules that govern public power generally. Accordingly, where
educators breach their public law duties, the Court’s consti-
tutional role is to hold them to account. That task is vexed
when it takes the form of an application for interim relief.
However, where, as in this case, there is an arguable case that
educators have breached their public law duties with serious
consequences for the students involved, it is entirely appro-
priate for the Court to grant that application. Commentators
are on sound ground when they question the ability of
financial means acting as a threshold that allows some par-
ents and students, but not all, to challenge such exercises of
public power. But in then questioning whether such chal-
lenges should exist at all, they risk throwing the baby out
with the bathwater.
In any event, Messrs Kennedy and Boyle and their coxed
eight rowing team did not make the A Final in the regatta,
but placed first in the B Final, which provides an apposite
allegory to this case: while this case might represent a victory
for the sound application of administrative law principles,
overall, it represents a troubling loss for accurate commen-
tary on judicial decisions. ❒
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